Economic affordability and access to water and waste services (WWS) are extensively studied topics in economic literature. However, most papers focus on social rights or the importance of water provision for equity and development. The impact of different regulatory and/or management models, the measurement of affordability and efficient pricing have all deserved the attention of researchers, but few studies assess the actual revenue impact of the existing social support mechanisms. For Portugal, while some preliminary data collection has taken place, a comprehensive review is still lacking. With this paper, the Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority (ERSAR) takes a first step towards filling that gap, by calculating the amount of subsidisation inherent in the adoption of social tariffs in mainland Portugal municipalities. Starting with an account of the current status quo, the article analyses different subsidisation situations, including a hypothetical framework where social tariffs are administered according to ERSAR's guidelines. Results indicate that, if ERSAR's Recommendation were fully applied, the number of social tariff beneficiaries could be above current figures, possibly translating into a disproportionate burden on the remaining WWS users through the application of higher bills. In the context of the severe economic crisis that is forcing families into increasing budgetary constraints, the article stresses issues of feasibility, drawing on the policy implications of the adoption of such discounts.
INTRODUCTION The water and waste sector in Portugal
In Portugal, water and waste services (WWS) are provided to end-users at the level of the municipality, as it is believed that the subsidiarity principle applies to these services. This means that each municiple operator has a significant degree of discretion regarding its modus operandum, namely in what concerns the tariff setting process. With 357 economically regulated operators serving 278 municipalities in the mainland, this form of organisation ultimately causes the sector to be very heterogeneous (ERSAR ). While this diversity is not necessarily unwarranted given differing levels of water stress, population density, or even budget and political priorities, it nevertheless gives rise to several obstacles: (i) it may in many cases not reflect the true cost of providing the service (be it because it is too expensive or too cheap), thereby (ii) creating situations of unaffordable prices as well as situations of lack of cost recovery by the operators, and (iii) possibly misleading end-users.
For illustrative purposes, Table 1 presents a summary of WWS charges, which shows how disparate the tariff landscape is in mainland Portugal. This situation is aggravated by the fact that tariff structures need not be coherent across municipalities. In fact, tariffs may include both a fixed and a variable (or volumetric) component, be composed only by either of these elements and even, in some cases, be non-existent, which amounts to providing WWS for free, possibly compromising the sustainability of their provision (Martins et al. ) .
Besides this, tariffs can further differ between increasing intended to constitute a benchmark for defining tariffs and contribute to harmonising pricing schemes, attaining reasonable, clear and affordable prices. The article proposes an assessment of its appropriateness in light of different municipal realities, and identifies opportunities for rectification.
The concept of social tariffs
A social tariff is hereby broadly defined as a reduced price targeted at domestic users with special needs. An important exception is the case of large household tariffs. Arguably, large household tariffs are also a means of providing social support, but since ERSAR makes a clear distinction between social and large household tariffs in its regulations, the price reductions designed for larger families were not considered in this paper. For benchmarking purposes, other countries such as the UK or France do not have a separate support mechanism for larger families ('WaterSure' n.d.; 'Aide financière pour la distribution de l'eau' n.d.).
According to the general notion provided in the previous paragraph, social tariff eligibility may depend on multiple criteria, depending on what is understood by 'special needs'. As such, age, income or employment status are all valid criteria.
For the present analysis, municipal criteria were surveyed and reproduced as currently applied by municipalities.
On the other hand, if one wants to follow ERSAR's Tariff Recommendation thoroughly, eligibility should depend solely on income: '(…) drinking water supply, urban wastewater and municipal waste management tariffs should be reduced for household users whose household gross income does not exceed a certain value determined by the operator, and shall not exceed twice the annual value of the minimum monthly wage' (ERSAR ). Taking the Portuguese minimum monthly wage for 2011, of 485€, this criterion implies that eligibility is granted by an annual gross income for tax purposes of 13,580€ or less (2 × 485 × 14 ¼ 13,580€, the 14 months accounting for holiday and Christmas subsidies). In this paper, it is assumed for simplicity that all municipalities choose this upper bound definition. Although plausibly unrealistic, this actually allows for producing as encompassing an analysis as possible.
Besides eligibility, price reductions also need to be defined. While each municipality may set its own rules (which are replicated in the article's calculations), Recommendation no. 1/2009 suggests that '(…) the ERSAR also provided data from the 2011 Quality of Service Assessment, which were used to obtain a proxy for the total number of users for each service. These data were complemented with INE's 2011 Census data.
The TA made available data on the number of tax forms and total gross declared taxable incomes per municipality, in 5000€ brackets, which, combined with micro data from the Finally, some of the data on the actual municipal social discounts were obtained through a survey that also collected information regarding the actual number of social users and social consumption profiles. However, some answers had to be discarded, as operators failed to discriminate between social and large household tariffs or to clarify the social tariff structure in place.
Tariff scenarios and social tariff beneficiaries
To quantify the impact of the application of social tariffs and assess the amount of subsidisation in each municipality, three distinct tariff scenarios were set.
The first scenario corresponds to the absence of social tariffs and was obtained directly through ERSAR's tariff database where general user tariffs are stored; the second scenario considers the social tariffs currently applied by municipalities; and finally the third consists of a synthetic scenario where social tariffs are applied according to ERSAR's Recommendation.
In addition to the tariff scenarios, two groups of users were considered: current beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries. The former are the number of social users reported by municipalities, while the latter are all those that would be eligible according to ERSAR's Recommendation.
The number of potential social tariff beneficiaries was estimated as:
where pbenef i stands for potential beneficiaries in the municipality i, x 1 , x 2 , x 3 stand for the percentages of households with total gross income for tax purposes in the first three TA 
Output measures
The output measures are as follows.
The number of 'current social tariff beneficiaries', obtained directly from survey answers. For 'potential beneficiaries', the computation follows Equation (1) in the previous section. The 'percentage of social tariff beneficiaries' is calculated as the ratio between social tariff beneficiaries and the total number of users in the municipality.
The 'value of the subsidy' is calculated as the revenue reduction stemming from social discounts, which is nevertheless counterbalanced by revenue increases from nonbeneficiary users, 'bill accrual for non-beneficiaries'.
Results are presented for three subsidisation situations, corresponding to different combinations of tariff scenarios and user groups: 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
According to ERSAR's tariff library and the survey to municipal providers, social tariffs are quite common in mainland Portugal, with nearly half of the municipalities having some kind of social mechanism to support vulnerable households. Table 2 provides a summary of the number of municipalities currently applying social tariffs in mainland Portugal. Note that, due to the data constraints previously outlined, the number of municipalities included in the article for computation purposes is below the total number of municipalities that claim to offer reduced prices and the numbers vary from service to service.
The current social tariff eligibility criteria applied by municipalities are quite diverse, but more than 90% of the municipalities surveyed do follow some sort of income criteria (Figure 1 ). At the same time, municipalities envisage adjustments for household size, with income thresholds defined in average terms. This is something ERSAR could learn from, in order to make its recommended criterion fairer. Indeed, the Recommendation does not take into account the number of people in each household. This is worth revising, as water consumption depends not only on income but also on the number of people using the service (Smets ). Table 3 shows the results for the first subsidisation situation.
Current tariffs and current beneficiaries
There are currently more people benefitting from social tariffs in DWS when compared with the other two services.
On average, per municipality, there are around 250 households currently benefitting from a social tariff, which can be considered a relatively low figure, given that they represent less than 4% of the total number of users of WWS.
However, inter-municipal tariff dispersion implies that such a percentage can in some cases reach 30%, so that caution is warranted in interpreting these results. . This translates into an annual value ranging from 1.7 to 1.8M€, depending on the level of consumption considered (5 m 3 /10 m 3 ).
Recommended tariffs and current beneficiaries
The second situation involves taking the price reductions proposed in ERSAR's Tariff Recommendation and applying them to those users currently benefiting from social tariffs. Thus, it
isolates the price effect of the Recommendation and allows for assessing how different municipal and recommended social discounts are. The results are reported in Table 5 . (Table 3) .
On average, the increase in non-beneficiary tariffs to guarantee the financing of social consumption (given the assumption of constant operator revenues) is not very severe. For 5 m 3 , the accrual is only of about 0.15€ for the three services, but bear in mind that these values are subject to significant variability. Indeed, in the most extreme case, the percentage increase per non-beneficiary can get to 32% when compared with current charges.
Turning to the global volume of subsidisation (Table 6) Maximum values are presented in italic. In this setting, the average number of beneficiaries (households earning less than twice the annual value of the minimum monthly wage, i.e. less than 13,580€ gross/year) represents almost 60% of the total number of domestic clients for each service. Such a high percentage immediately signals that the (upper limit) eligibility criterion used is way too encompassing, serving merely as an academic hypothesis.
Still, this upper bound situation remains useful for testing the robustness of ERSAR's Tariff Recommendation.
As shown in Table 7 , the amount of subsidy corresponding to the full adoption of ERSAR's social tariffs would be on average, per municipality and per month, about 27,000€ in DWS, The total subsidisation volume for this hypothetical scenario is presented in Table 8 , with more than 15M Maximum values are presented in italic. for a monthly consumption of 10 m 3 . These figures are again excessively high, further supporting the adoption of a revised eligibility criterion. In a context where public budgets are highly constrained, such a level of subsidisation would be very difficult to achieve even if one admits the creation of a specific fund.
Beyond the main issue of eligibility, recall that ERSAR's price reduction mechanism was already more generous than the discounts applied currently by the municipalities (see the previous subsection), suggesting that some adjustment to the proposed price cuts could also possibly be warranted on behalf of the sustainable financing of social tariffs.
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
This article paves the way to a deeper assessment of the functioning of social support mechanisms in the Portuguese water and waste sector. As a first attempt at quantifying the amounts of cross-subsidisation from 'general' to 'low-income' households implied by the application of ERSAR's Recommendation no. 1/2009, it leaves important practical questions unaddressed. The most important is the homogeneous eligibility criterion used, when the recommendation allows each operator to set a different limit. This could be refined, e.g. by using municipal purchasing power indexes and revising the estimation of potential users accordingly.
This would mean that a different income threshold for each municipality would have to be defined.
It is important to note that the article abstracted from potential take-up problems, in that (i) on the one hand, it is possible that there are currently less people benefiting from social discounts in WWS than those that actually fit the requirements, and (ii) on the other hand, even if 60% of households were eligible, it is likely that a smaller percentage would indeed apply for the reduced tariffs (Hernanz et al. ) . As such, the article's findings are not necessarily as radical as they might seem. Furthermore, since the universe of WWS clients is more encompassing than just domestic users, it is reasonable to think that, in reality, the increase in non-beneficiary tariffs could be shared with other types of users.
Another caveat that will hopefully be coped with in the future has to do with the cost-side of WWS provision as well as the total revenues of each operator. An approach taking these costs into account would be better prepared to discuss the appropriateness of the current prices.
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